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ZSOLT SARKADY 
The Lex Aquilia and the Standards of Care 
In Ancient Rome the only acts recognized as criminal were „exceptional invasions of 
public security or of the general order of society".' As such, Roman 'criminal law' 
would have failed to meet the needs of any highly organized society. The Romans 
decided upon a „practical remedy", the laws of Delict, by which they „extended the 
doctrine of civil obligations", 2 to cover the realm of personal property. Violations of 
these standards of care carried with them „penal consequences". 3 Private law was 
originally dominated by the Twelve Tables, which soon became „harsh and inflexible 
antique rules" in cosmopolitan Rome. The „punitive vengeance" of the Twelve Tables 
evolved into legal sanctions to compel compensation when damage was done to private 
property. However, these sanctions retained a distinct „punitive character". 4 
Sanctions were thus developed to protect three principal rights of the Roman citizen 
not originally protected by criminal law: the security of his property, his security from 
theft and his right to be „protected from deliberate anti-social attacks" on his dignity.' 
The Lex Aquilia governed loss wrongfully inflicted to property (damnum iniuria datum), 
whereas the Delicts of Furtum, Rapina and Iniuria were designed to deal with theft, 
robbery and attacks on personal dignity respectively. In order to be liable under the Lex 
Aquilia the defendant had to be found guilty of intent and culpable conduct (iniuria 
datum), and thus to have „wrongfully inflicted" loss (datum) on the plaintiff. 6 
The early Romans maintained strict standards that governed personal behavior and 
this is reflected in the legal reasoning implicit in the lex. Frier argued that while the 
ancient Romans „were under no general obligation" to ensure that others did not 
experience material loss, they were required „to act with care" in circumstances where 
their actions risked causing such loss to another.' An examination of the twin pillars of 
the lex, the Praetor's Edict and the juristical interpretations of the Lex Aquilia 
(illustrated by the actions ad factum and actio utiles) and selected cases from Frier's 
Casebook on the Roman Law of Delict will demonstrate that unwritten 'standards of 
care' clearly existed in Roman law though they are never mentioned explicitly.' The 
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foremost legal reasoning behind the lex was the understanding that one had a civic 
responsibility as a Roman to not wrongfully cause another loss. 
Standards of care as expressed by  Cu/pa and Do/us 
„Loss wrongfully inflicted" (damnum iniuria datum) forms the basis of Aq. uilian 
liability. Definitions of the term „iniuria" changed during the evolution of Roman law. 
The term was originally held to mean „without legal right". Juristical interpretation lent 
iniuria an additional meaning, that of „wrongfulness". Defendants were considered only 
guilty of inflicting loss without legal right if they had „acted in a way positively 
improper and worthy of legal reproach". The concept of „wrongfulness" strongly 
suggests that „legal rules" governing what conduct was expected from citizens „in 
various situations". Frier' points out that the Lex Aquilia „only sketchily described the 
content of such rules" and that those which do exist are the creation of the jurists. This is 
not unsurprising however. The early ancient Romans, a people with both a traditional 
loathing for autocracy and a deep respect for the rights of the citizen would have resisted 
codifying laws explicitly stating what conduct was expected of them. Nicholas argues'° 
that the Romans would have interpreted such an attempt to impose defined duties as „an 
unwarranted restriction on personal freedom". Thus „standards of care" as expressed in 
the Lex Aquilia were not codified, but can be defined as such: citizens were expected to 
act in the manner befitting a Roman. 
As citizens, Romans were obliged to understand the „prerequisites of social life" and 
were expected to tailor their actions so as to avoid causing loss to others. In Case 19 
Paul maintains" that a tree-trimmer on private land is liable for killing a passing slave by 
„throwing down a branch" because in failing to call out or „foresee what a careful 
person should have foreseen" he had violated these social prerequisites. Culpa (fault), as 
Paul stipulated,' arises when a defendant ignores the mutually understood, but 
unwritten, obligations of the Roman and wrongfully causes loss to another. 
It is for this reason that Ulpianus „construes iniuria as loss inflicted by culpa" even 
when „the wish to harm" was absent, for one has a duty to be careful and aware. Dolus, 
(intentional fault) arises when one ignores these obligations „with a deliberate intent" to 
cause loss." The civic obligations implicit in the notions of culpa and dolus imply the 
existence of an unwritten standard of care, and Frier even describes the adherence to the 
aforementioned obligations as a „duty of care". Daube points out" that the existence of a 
third standard of Aquilian liability, that of casus (accident) can only be seen as 
concerned with compensation, because unlike culpa (characterised by negligence) or 
dolus (characterised by evil intent) sheer accident does not involve a breach of any 
standard of care. It is important to note that the juristical interpretation of the lex there 
was no liability for casus. 
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'The Meaning behind the lex' — actions ad factum and actio utiles and the Standards of 
Care 
Nicholas states" that Roman law did not formally utilize the concept of duty. By 
implying that the lex upheld standards of care, one would be implying that Romans 
could be liable for acts of omission, by failing to live up to those standards and thus 
omitting their duties. Nicholas suggests that because the lex itself couldn't be used to 
directly impose standards of care' 6 (possibly for the reasons suggested above). This role 
was played by juristic interpretation and the use of individual actions ad factum and 
actio utiles. This was to lead to an extension Aquilian liability, which often established 
liability for individual omissions of duty. 
The first section of the Lex Aquilia covered the unlawful „slaying" (occidere) of four 
footed animals and slaves (the most important possessions in an archaic, agrarian 
society), whereas the third section covered all other unlawful damage to property caused 
by „burning, breaking, or rending" (urere, frangere, rumpere). Frier claims that the lex 
was not drafted in a skilful manner and „required rather awkward interpretation" which 
led the lex to be redefined by the Roman jurists, who narrowed the interpretation of what 
was considered „slaying" but broadened the meaning of „rending" to include as many 
forms of damage as they could. However, in his History and Principles of the Civil Law 
of Rome, Sheldon Amos argues that the interpretation of such „wrongful acts" was left 
deliberately vague." This was done precisely to allow for such liberal interpretation on 
behalf of the jurists, in the hope that the juristical interpretations would enable the lex to 
apply to as many offenders as possible. In his The Rise of the Roman Jurists Frier 
himself hails these jurists as the „oracles of law". 19 
The lex and the juristical texts of Gaius, Celsus, Ulpianus and others guided the 
decisions of Praetors by giving them a reference to legal precedent and to juristical 
interpretation. The number of instances where actions ad factum and actio utiles are 
recorded by Frier demonstrates that the Praetors were often left to deal with cases not 
covered by the lex, 2° using only the what precedent existed, juristical thought, the 
unwritten Roman standard of care and their own common sense as guides. Juristical 
interpretation led to a widening of the lex by lending Aquilian liability to the actions ad 
factum and actio utiles. The terms ad factum (action „on the facts") and actio utiles (an 
analogous action) seem to be used interchangeably. They would be granted by the 
Praetor to provide legal sanction in cases where the Defendant had not contravened the 
literal wording of the lex. The notion clearly existed that the defendant's actions, which 
were not technically in contravention of the wording of the lex, but could in fact, by way 
of the facts of the case or by simple analogy, be seen to contravene the ideal behind the 
lex were liable nonetheless. This strongly confirms the existence of unwritten standards 
of care» 
15 NICHOLAS, BARRY: op. cit. p. 234. 
16 Ibid, p. 235. 
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Case 5 demonstrates the presence of an underlying yet unwritten ideal behind the 
first section of the lex. In this case Labeo distinguishes between slaying and furnishing 
the cause of death. The wording of the first section of the lex maintains liability only 
when someone „slays" another. However, cases exist where despite no contravention of 
the literal wording of the lex, the civic responsibility of the standards of care have 
clearly been breached, resulting in a death and thus the loss of property. In Case 5 Labeo 
maintains that a midwife who doesn't directly „slay" by actually administering a poison 
is liable for an action ad factum even though she merely prescribed a poison as a drug, 
for in so doing she had furnished the cause of death. Labeo is clear that technically the 
lex was unbreached, but demonstrates equally clearly there had been a breach of 
something, resulting in the action ad factum. Though the lex was unbreached, the 
„meaning behind the lex" had been. This deeper „meaning" could only be the unwritten 
Roman standards of care. By negligently or deliberately prescribing á" poison the 
midwife was guilty of culpa, for she had violated not only her contract with the slaves' 
owner but also the social prerequisites of Roman life. 
Juristical interpretation also aided the development of the third section of the lex. In 
Case 8 Frier quotes from Gaius' interpretation of the third section in his Institutiones: 
„...a thing is considered as »rent« (ruptum) when it is »spoiled« (corruptum) in any 
way.. .torn, dashed and poured out and in any way harmed or destroyed"." The jurists 
chose to interpret rent as spoiled, thus allowing the actions ad factum and actio utiles to 
prevent defendants from escaping Aquilian liability for causing loss not directly 
forbidden by the wording of the lex. In Case 12 Paul records that when someone 
„consumes another's wine or grain" they could not escape a fine by arguing that the 
wine and grain had not been damaged (neither torn, rent or broken) but instead used for 
its implicit purpose, that of consumption." As there has clearly been a violation of civic 
responsibility in that the defendant knowingly or negligently violated the standards of 
care, Paul writes that an analogous action should be given against him. 
In Case 13 Ulpianus is recorded as maintaining that Aquilian liability is also 
extended to a carter who had „improperly packed" his cargo, which had then 
subsequently come loose and caused loss. Ulpianus is not suggesting that the carter 
deliberately rigged his cart to cause another wrongful loss. Rather Ulpianus is holding 
the carter responsible for negligent behaviour, in violation of the standards of care. 
Thus, the culpa lay not in damage done (which was physically caused by a rock) but in 
the violation of the standards of care, the failure to take the required amount of care in 
the act of packing the cart. In having failed to live up to the unwritten code of conduct of 
the Ancient Romans, the man is liable. 
Causation 
The Roman notion of causation ensures defendants are liable for the consequences of 
their actions." If loss was directly caused by a defendant's actions he would be liable 
under the lex. If a significant degree of physical directness existed between the act and 
the result and loss was caused, the defendant was held liable for an ad factum or 
22 FRIER, BRUCE W.: op. cit. p. 126. 
23 KEGAN PAUL: op. cit. p. 152. 
24 LEAGE, R. W.: op. cit. p. 36. 
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analogous action. Even in cases where no intent existed and that the result may have 
been entirely undesired by the defendant, liability still exists because one is held to be 
responsible for the causes of one's actions. Frier illustrates the notion" of „causation" in 
Case 50 with a quote from Ulpianus' Edict. Ulpianus presents us with the opinions of 
Labeo and Celsus about the following hypothetical situation: a man starts a fire on his 
property, and the fire spreads to engulf his neighbours property. Even assuming that the 
man did not intend the fire to cause damage his neighbours property, he is still liable 
according to Celsus. R.W Leage, in Roman Private Law, suggested that „where an act is 
done in certain circumstances blame is automatically attributed to the actor and his state 
of mind is irrelevant", allowing the facts to speak for themselves." 
Labeo maintains that if the fire was started in an apartment the defendant would be 
liable under the lex. This is probably due to the fact that fires in urban centres were 
incredibly dangerous, and that one could not suppose that lighting a fire in an apartment 
would have any other consequences except mass destruction. Celsus maintains that even 
if the fire was started in a field, where the burning of fields was common practice to 
clear land of brush and stubble, one was liable for the destruction caused by one's fault. 
Celsus argued that the defendant „did not burn the field directly" and thus was not liable 
under the lex. Nonetheless the defendant had caused the damage in „allow(ing) the fire 
to escape", which constituted a violation of the standards of care. This, Celsus 
concluded, enables the plaintiff to sue for an action ad factum." 
Likewise, regardless of intent or desire, a defendant would be liable under the lex for 
striking a slave with a pillow if this caused his death or in any way caused loss to his 
master. Case 49 stipulates „different things are fatal for different people" thus the 
defence that the blow was weak or that the blow was not strong enough to slay the 
average man would not allow the defendant to escape liability. This suggests that 
Romans were bound by certain unwritten conventions to be careful (Frier's dubs them a 
„duty of care") when dealing with another's property." 
Frier writes 29 that the Romans likely „avoided intricate analysis of causation" to 
avoid the possibility that the myriad questions surrounding „proximate and foreseeable 
causes" would perhaps „restrict the duty of care that Romans owed to the property of 
others". However, this did not prevent „the two greatest jurists of the high classical 
period" of Roman Law, Celsus and Julian from being sharply divided when the chain of 
events („the chain of causation") „doesn't run to its likeliest outcome, but is interrupted 
by another event". Frier also suggests that this controversy illuminates the debate as to 
whether the lex was designed to be punitive or merely to compensate for loss." 
The Nature of the Lex 
In Case 54 Celsus argues that, if a slave is stabbed and mortally wounded by one 
assailant and then given an additional wound by another assailant which results in actual 
25 FRIER, BRUCE W.: Op. Cit. p. 216. 
26 LEAGE, R. W.: op. cit. p. 48. 
27  Ibid, p. 38. 
28 FRIER, BRUCE W: op. cit. p. 221. 
29 !bid, p. 229. 
3') !bid, P.  216. 
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death, the first attacker is liable for wounding and the second for the slaying itself. 3 ' In 
Case 56 Julian disagreed and maintained that both assailants would be liable under the 
[ex. Julian defends this position against those he fears will think it preposterous by 
pointing out that „it would be far more preposterous if neither was liable under the Lex 
Aquilia, or just one, since it ought not to be that misdeeds go unpunished (...)". By 
arguing that both men would be liable under the lex, Julian is suggesting that both men 
would owe compensation (though in differing valuations depending on the 
circumstances of the case) for the same dead slave. Even Celsus, who takes a slightly 
more liberal view, still maintains that the first assailant could be liable for having 
wounded the slave, whereas only the second assailant would be liable for having slain." 
No doubt the amount of compensation varied greatly between „wounding" and 
„slaying", but Celsus nonetheless agrees that the plaintiff could be compensated twice 
for the same deceased slave. 
What was the true nature of the lex? Was it punitive, an archaic left over from the 
personal vengeance of the Twelve Tables? Was it designed to punish Romans who had 
violated the crucial standards of care which bound Roman society together? Or did the 
lex only exist to ensure pecuniary compensation for loss ? Nicholas believed" that 
Roman law generally was „a movement, never completed in Roman times, from the 
principle of vengeance for an injury to that of compensation for damage done". 
The Laws of Delict, like all aspects of Roman law, evolved from the Twelve Tables. 
Originally, a „manifest thief' (one caught „red-handed") was subject to membrum 
ruptum, or severe bodily harm. 34 If the thief was brought to a magistrate with the goods 
in hand he would have been promptly scourged and handed over to the plaintiff, who 
could then demand financial compensation (or continue the corporal punishment). Soon 
the plaintiff was bound to accept an arbitrary sum as compensation and corporal 
punishment could only be visited on the wrong doer's person if he defaulted on 
payment. Soon reipersecutory action (the payment of compensation) alone could be 
visited on the defendant. Nicholas argues" that delictual actions were clearly classified 
by the Romans as being penal, as its origins seem to attest. The term „penal" implies that 
the fine imposed was a penalty, whose essential characteristic was vindictive, rather than 
a compensation to the plaintiff. 
The penal aspect of delictical actions survived in the Lex Aquilia, and can be clearly 
perceived in cases where the plaintiff is awarded a payment that exceeds the amount that 
could be justified by a mere compensatory statute. The penal aspect of the lex can be 
seen in Cases 53 and 56, in which the plaintiff is given just such a double 
compensation." More importantly, this penal nature is also written into the text of the 
lex. In the first section the defendant must pay „as much money as the maximum the 
property was worth in the year (previous to the slaying)". Likewise the third section 
provides that „as much as the matter (res) will be worth within the next thirty days (after 
the act in question)". In both cases the maximum value of the property is awarded as 
compensation, the unfairness of which can easily be demonstrated. If the intent of the lex 
31 NICHOLAS, BARRY.: op. cit. p. 256. 
32 Ibid, p. 217. 
33 Ibid, p. 217. 
34 KELLY, J. M.: „The Meaning of the Lex Aquilia", Law Quarterly Review80 (1964) p. 153. 
35 NICHOLAS, BARRY: op. cit. p. 217. 
36 KELLY, J. M.: op. cit. p. 49. 
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was merely to compensate why then would the owner of a slave killed in November be 
entitled to compensation for the value of the slave in the previous November even if the 
slave had been crippled during the summer and thus had been significantly devalued? H. 
F Jolowicz says" such a result is „so obviously unfair that one cannot believe any 
legislator intended it". 
Jolowicz very plausibly suggests that this situation developed because the Romans 
never established a „consistent theory of damages" nor „clearly distinguished between 
market value and value to the owner"." However, it is equally plausible that the 
„unfairness" of the fines imposed by the Lex Aquilia could be the last vestiges of the 
scourging once delivered to violators of the standards of care. The punishment is no 
longer physical, but exists nonetheless in a financial form. Leage sees this move to 
financial rather than corporal punishment as the beginning of the shift towards the 
principal that the fines were to be „remedies granted for acts" and not punishments." 
However, the Lex Aquilia undeniably retained a penal character. If the basis for 
Aquilian liability was compensatory, and did not involve a penalty for the violation of 
unwritten standards of care, why then does an action under the lex against a lunatic or a 
minor fail? Surely the owner has a right to compensation for the loss incurred? 
However, the Romans recognised that neither party was privy to the „social 
prerequisites" of Roman life, and thus were incapable of culpa or of wrongful conduct. 
Damnum 
An examination of the Roman concept of loss (damnum) further suggests the 
possibility of punitive fines due to a violation of the standards of care. Aquilian liability 
required the plaintiff to have „suffered a measurable loss" and that the loss had been 
caused by the defendant. Lupines points out 4" that even if a slave was not reduced in 
price the defendants was liable for acts that caused the plaintiff to suffer "expenses for 
his (the slave's) health and safety." 
Damnum came to represent the loss directly incurred by the incident and also „the 
loss stemming indirectly from the act" or the damnum emergens. With juristical 
interpretation, compensation for damnum was extended as the definitions of such key 
terms as „to slay" and „to rend" were widened to encompass as many transgression of 
the standards of care possible. Liability was even achieved for loss or injury to free sons 
under the power of the paterfamilias, but not in the case of actual death (as the son was 
not technically property) but for „expenses or lost income that stem therefrom". 4 ' 
37 JOLOWICZ, H. F.: „The Original Scope of the Lex Aquilia and the Question of Damages". Law 
Quarterly Review 38 (1922) p. 46. 
Ibid, p. 48. 
39 Ibid, p. 48. 
4° KELLY, J. M.: op. cit. p. 50. 
41 Ibid, p. 50. 
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Denying Liability 
However, the very wording of the lex ensures that the fines imposed are often 
disproportionate with the loss caused has already been examined. Moreover, in what 
Frier dubs the „quasi-punitive nature of the lex" a double indemnity can be incurred 
when the defendant denies liability and liability is in fact discovered to exist by the 
iudex (judge)." In this situation the plaintiff would receive double the amount due him 
to compensate him for the loss incurred. This could have been done to encourage the 
truthfulness which would avoid the necessity of a trial, perhaps also serving to reduce 
the flow of cases before the weary Praetors and iudices. 
Nevertheless, the double indemnity suggests the lex had a distinctly punitive nature. 
This punishment infers that above and beyond the responsibility to compensate the 
plaintiff the defendant has also violated and is liable for violating unwritten standards of 
care. This is reflected in the generally harsh treatment of the defendant under the lex. 
The defendant is often held liable for causing damnum regardless of the existence of 
intent, the defendant could be required to pay the plaintiff more compensation than he is 
technically due and the defendant was forced to either admit liability instantly or risk a 
double indemnity. This could be explained because the defendants, assumed to have 
violated the standards of care, were not considered as deserving of much consideration." 
Defences 
In order to understand the theory of the standards of care implicit in the lex one must - 
examine the exceptios (defences) that could be offered to deny liability. One could 
escape liability if one could prove that the injured or deceased slave had assumed 
responsibility for the risk which caused the loss, that one was acting in legitimate self-
defence or if one was acting out of legitimate necessity. In these circumstances the 
standards of care had been waived either by the slave himself or by the gravity of the 
situation." 
Though the „prerequisites of social life" bound only fellow masters, a slave was an 
intellectual free agent whose actions could alter the duties implied by the standards of 
care. Thus, in Case 60 an action under the lex is unsuccessful when the a slave is struck 
down crossing a field reserved for javelin-throwing. Contributory negligence arises 
because the slave „ought not to have passed through a field reserved for javelin-
throwing". Case 60 also confirms that intent is sometimes unnecessary for liability under 
the lex to exist, for if a slave is killed while others were tossing javelins „in sport" the 
defendants will be liable. Paul writes' „a harmful game is also counted as culpa", 
because, one must speculate, such behaviour was beneath what was expected of a 
Roman citizen and thus transgressed against the unwritten standards of care. 
When a defendant slays a slave in self-defence no liability is allowed under the lex 
and the owner of the slave is not entitled to compensation. However, as Case 64 details, 
the natural right of self-defence did not permit the victim of aggression to himself 
42 FRIER, BRUCE W.: op. cit. p. 63. 
43 Ibid, p. 65. pp. 
44 Ibid, p. 67. 
45 KEGAN PAUL: op. cit. p. 86. 
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violate the standards of care. Even when engaged in the act of self-defence Paul records 
„it is permitted to strike only the person who used force"." Thus, when a bystander is 
injured by the victim of aggression, the victim is liable under the lex. 
In Case 66 Celsus advances the notion that one cannot be held to be liable for 
destroying a neighbour's house in order to construct a firebreak because of the existence 
of „legitimate fear" in the defendant. It is this same principal of legitimate fear, which 
evokes the natural right to self-preservation, which enables the defendant to use lethal 
force to repel an armed attacker and likewise provides for fire breaking.' Thus, 
exceptional circumstances exist whereby the defendant is excused from liability. This 
could be explained by arguing that the standards of care cease to be relevant when 
legitimate fear is aroused. However, in Case 69 Ulpianus clarifies that if the victim of 
aggression is seen to have killed an armed assailant when he could have just as safely 
taken him prisoner, then he is guilty of undue vengeance and, under the Lex Cornelia, is 
held to have „wrongfully killed" the slave. This is another example of the defendant 
being held responsible for not acting in a manner which befitted a Roman, for cowardly 
or vengeful killings were ignoble, and thus meant to be beneath a Roman citizen." 
Conclusion 
The fact that standards of care were deliberately omitted from the wording of lex is a 
subject that has been extensively commented upon by Nicholas, Amos and a host of 
scholars in the field of Roman Law. Neither the austere patrician Republicans nor the 
ever agitating Tribunes of the Plebs of Ancient Rome would ever have abided the direct 
intrusion of legal regulations into the private sphere. However, the strict but common 
idealised virtues of the Roman citizen (honesty, integrity, obedience, honour) defined 
the „prerequisites of social life" Romans had to observe to avoid the risk of culpa. These 
virtues were unofficially woven into the fabric of the Lex Aquilia by Rome's jurists, 
who in widening the definition of Aquilian liability, subtly entrenched the concept of the 
standards of care. 
The very nature of the lex, at first apparently concerned merely with compensation, 
seems punitive when one considers the issues of double compensation and the recent 
'maximum value' compensation. This punitive nature denotes that defendants were 
being punished for their actions as well as being called to offer compensation to the 
plaintiff. What but for a violation of the standards of care could this punishment be 
addressing? What is the notion of culpa but the admission that such an unwritten code 
existed to be transgressed upon? Moreover, the „quasi-punitive" fines imposed for 
denying liability seem to be nuisance fees imposed on violators of the standards of care 
for not only committing a wrongful act, but for having wasted the court's time by 
displaying the un-Roman audacity to deny responsibility when called to account. 
Foremost amongst the all important social prerequisites of Roman life was the idea that 
one should not cause loss to others (exceptional exceptios aside) and it was this ideal 
that stands as the principal tenant in the legal reasoning behind the Lex Aquilia. 
46 KEGAN PAUL: op. cit. p. 88. 
47 FRIER, BRUCE W.: op. cit. p. 67. 
48 KEGAN PAUL: op. cit. p. 88. 
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A LEX AQUILIA ÉS A GONDOSKODÁSI MÉRTÉK 
(Összefoglalás) 
Az ókori Róma csupán egyetlen magatartást ismert mint bűncselekményt: a 
közbiztonság,  illetve az általános társadalmi rend elleni támadást. Ugyanakkor ez nem • 
jelenti azt, hogy a Római büntető jog elmulasztotta volna megalkotni egy magasan 
szervezett társadalom  rendjét óvó szabályokat, különösen nem jelenti azt, hogy ne 
létezett volna büntetőjog. 
Ellenkezőleg, az erősen kazuista jellegű római jog egy „praktikus jogorvoslati 
módszert" dolgozott ki a mai értelemben vett „tényállásszerű magatartások" szankcioná-
lására. A magán tulajdon megóvására megalkotott magánjogi — ezen belül kötelmi jogi — 
doktrínákat kiterjesztette egyéb magatartásokra is. Ennek következtében ezeknek a 
gondoskodási mértékeknek (Standards of Care) az  áthágása poenalis következmé-
nyekhez vezetett. 
A pozitív jogot eredetileg uraló XII. Táblás törvény hamarosan  túlságosan nyers, 
merev és szigorú antik szabállyá vált a kozmopolita Romában. Éppen ezért bír különös 
jelentősséggel a Lex Aquilia, mely vitathatatlanul a legjelentősebb  jogalkotási terméke 
volt a XII. Táblás törvényt követő Római jognak. Jelentőségét különösen az indokolja, 
hogy elfogadását, illetve hatályba lépését követően hatályát vesztette valamennyi 
korábbi jogellenes károkozással kapcsolatos jogszabály. Ez elsősorban abból a szem-
pontból bír különös jelentőséggel, hogy a Lex Aquilia elfogadásával létrejött egy 
egységes kódex-szerű jogszabály, mely egy helyen igyekezett szabályozni a tulajdon-
joggal kapcsolatos valamennyi károkozási cselekményt. 
A Lex Aquilia elfogadását alapvetően a változó  társadalmi viszonyok tették szüksé-
gessé. Az autarchikus parasztgazdaság  helyét egyre inkább a rabszolga munkarendszer 
váltja fel, melynek következtében felbomlanak a házközösségek. A házközösségek 
felbomlása pedig szétfeszítette a régi vagyoni kereteket. 
A szűk paraszti életviszonyokból kibontakozó Róma viszonyainak  tehát már nem 
feletek meg a régi kötött szabályok, valami rugalmasabb megoldást kellett találni a 
legfontosabb vagyontárgyak — a rabszolga, valamint az igavonó barom — védelmére. 
Ilyen körülmények között jött létre a Lex Aquilia, melynek három része nem csupán 
a magánjogi, hanem a büntető jellegű  szabályok foglalatát igyekezett nyújtani. 
